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THE COILED SERPENT OF ARGUMENT: REASON,
AUTHORITY, AND LAW IN A TALMUDIC TALE
DAVID LUBAN*

I.

THE OVEN OF AKHNAI

One of the most celebrated Talmudic parables begins with a remarkably dry legal issue debated among a group of rabbis. A modern
reader should think of the rabbis as a collegial court, very much like a
secular appellate court, because the purpose of their debate is to generate edicts that will bind the community. The issue under debate
concerns the ritual cleanliness of a baked earthenware stove, sliced
horizontally into rings and cemented back together with unbaked
mortar. Do the laws of purity that apply to uncut stoves apply to this
one as well? This stove is the so-called "oven of Akhnai" (oven of
serpents). Presumably, its horizontal bands separated by mortar made
it look like a coiled serpent; but according to the Talmud, it is the
oven of Akhnai because the legal debate coiled the rabbis in serpentine arguments. Therein lies a remarkable tale.'
On that day, Rabbi Eli'ezer presented all the proofs in the world,
but [the other Rabbis] did not accept them. [Rabbi Eli'ezerl said:
"If the law is as I say, then this carob tree will prove it." The carob
jumped a hundred cubits. (Some say: four hundred cubits.) They
said: "One does not prove anything from a tree." Rabbi Eli'ezer
then said: "If the law is as I say, then this aqueduct will prove it."
The [water in the] aqueduct began to flow upstream. They said:
"One does not prove anything from an aqueduct." Rabbi Eli'ezer
said: "If the law is as I say, then the walls of the academy will prove
it." The walls began to fall. Rabbi Yehoshua [Joshua] reprimanded
* Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center.
I would like to thank Thomas Grey and Michael Seidman for comments on the first draft. I
presented this paper at the Georgetown Faculty Workshop and the Chicago-Kent College of
Law "Law &" Symposium. I am grateful to participants in both for their comments. Special
thanks to Claire Hill for encouraging me to write this Article.
1. It is a tale whose significance for American legal theory has received extensive analysis
in Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuitof the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813,841-47, 855-65 (1993). Stone's
analysis intersects my own in numerous places; I note some as the paper proceeds. Stone
observes that numerous writers on American legal theory have addressed the Oven of Akhnai
story. See id. at 841 n. 154.
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[the walls]: "If scholars argue a point of law, what business is it of
yours?" To show respect for Rabbi Yehoshua, they did not fall further; and to show respect for Rabbi Eli'ezer, they did not straighten
up; and so they are still leaning. Then Rabbi Eli'ezer said: "If the
law is as I say, it shall be proven from heaven." A bat kol [a divine
voice or echo] pronounced: "What have you against Rabbi
Eli'ezer? The law is always as he says." Rabbi Yehoshua then stood
up and said: "It is not in heaven" (Deut. 30:12). What does this
mean? Rabbi Yirmiyah [Jeremiah] said: "As the Torah has been
given from Mount Sinai, we take no heed of a bat kol-for at
written in the Torah [that we
Mount Sinai You have already
'2
should] 'follow the majority." '
There is more to the story than this. But this much is already
stunning, and it already raises an important issue about, in the words
of Scott J. Shapiro, "the paradoxical nature of authority.... Authorities claim the right to impose their will on others regardless of
whether their judgments are correct. In doing so, they appear to place
themselves above the truth-their right does not seem to depend on
their being right."'3 Eliezer was right, and heaven itself proclaimed
that he was right-but Joshua and the other rabbis insisted on their
authority to ignore the voice of heaven.
One might object to Shapiro's way of posing the paradox by observing that he seems to treat matters of legal interpretation as
though they are matters of fact, with a clear-cut right and wrong answer. Although some answers to legal questions are plainly wrong
("goats and grapefruits" is never the right answer to the legal question "what is the speed limit?"), there may be more than one acceptable answer to legal questions, and one job of authorities like courts
is, plausibly, to settle on one such answer, not because it is uniquely
right, but because it is reasonable and defensible and society needs a
2.

THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION: VOLUME ONE: AUTHORITY 263-64 (Michael

Walzer et al. eds. & trans., 2000) [hereinafter: AUTHORITY] (translating BABYLONIAN
TALMUD, Bava Metzia *59b). Because I read only a few words of Hebrew, I work with several
translations (and a little help from my friends). Other translations are the old Soncino Press
version, THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Seder Nezikin, Baba Mezia 352-53 (H. Freedman trans.,
1935) [hereinafter: SONCINO TALMUD], and the new Artscroll/Mesorah edition, THE
3
3
SCHOTTENSTEIN EDITION TALMUD BAVLI, 2 Tractate Bava Metzia 59a -59b (Rabbi Nosson
Scherman & Rabbi Meir Zlotowitz, eds. & trans., 2001) [hereinafter: ARTSCROLL TALMUD].
The beautifully produced Artscroll edition, with its facing Hebrew and phrase-by-phrase translation, is particularly useful.
The translations use various transliterations of the Hebrew names. I follow the following convention: I will use the translation's version when I am quoting it-hence, "Eli'ezer,"
"Yehoshua," "Yirmiyah" -but a standard English transliteration in my own text.
3. Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 383 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). Shapiro introduces
his article with the Oven of Akhnai story. Id. at 382.
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single authoritative answer. Against this view, some legal philosophers (most notably Ronald Dworkin) hold that there is one and only
one right answer, 4 so that assimilating matters of legal interpretation
to matters of fact is no error. Shapiro's way of framing the paradox of
authority fits comfortably with the right-answer thesis. I do not propose to review the debate over this thesis here, though I return to it
subsequently. For the moment, we may content ourselves with noticing that the Oven of Akhnai story plainly assumes the right-answer
thesis. That's the whole point of bringing the bat kol into the story. It
proclaims that Eliezer is right, and the news about the One Right
Answer comes straight from the brooding omnipresence in the sky.
So Shapiro's way of posing the paradox accurately captures what is
going on in the Oven of Akhnai story.
The story is a powerful one, and I suspect that one source of its
power is that Eliezer's appeal to the bat kol has strong psychological
resonance with most readers. If you have ever been frustrated in an
argument because the other people were simply not getting it, not
seeing that you were right and they were wrong, you will surely sympathize with Eliezer's passionate "Let heaven prove it!" and the fantasy that some bat kol might finally echo down from heaven and make
them understand. In his film Annie Hall, Woody Allen finds himself
standing in a theater line behind an obnoxious man pontificating
about the theories of Marshall McLuhan. Allen immediately produces Marshall McLuhan, who tells the man, "You know nothing of
my work!" To film this scene, Allen recruited the real Marshall
McLuhan for a cameo appearance as a kind of bat kol. The scene delights us because it fulfills an infantile fantasy we all have about finally making the idiots see that we're right and they are wrong. The
fable of the bat kol, like Allen's cinematic fantasy, answers to a thoroughly objectivist image of the truth and a psychological need all of
us sometimes feel to force the disbelievers to see what is indisput5
able.
4. See Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977).
5. Robert Nozick, in a discussion of the coercive power of arguments, comments wryly on
the fact that even though "philosophy is carried on as a coercive activity, the penalty philosophers wield is, after all, rather weak," because the other person "can skip away happily maintaining his previous belief." PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 4 (1990). Nozick goes on:
"Perhaps philosophers need arguments so powerful they set up reverberations in the brain: if
the person refuses to accept the conclusion, he dies. How's that for a powerful argument? Yet,
as with other physical threats ('your money or your life'), he can choose defiance. A 'perfect'
philosophical argument would leave no choice." Id.
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But to the pig-headed, nothing is indisputable. Rabbi Joshua
won't even listen to the bat kol. Imagine that in a Supreme Court
argument about the intent of the Framers of the Constitution you
could march in James Madison, like Marshall McLuhan, to announce
to the justices, "You know nothing of my work!" And then imagine
that the Supreme Court says, in effect, "Go away, James Madison.
Who cares what you say about your own intent?" The willfulness of
Rabbi Joshua seems equally perverse. He cares about his own authority, it seems, more than he cares about the truth of what he says. But
his authority rests solely on his claim to be expounding precisely the
truth that he now insists he doesn't wish to hear.
II. THE PLATONIC INTERPRETATION
Let us move for a moment from Jerusalem to Athens. The problem here is one that deeply preoccupied Plato. In some sense, it was
the central question of his philosophy (and thus of all Western philosophy, if Whitehead was right that all philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato). There is a difference between truth and mere opinion.
But, Plato believed, the multitude consistently mistakes their own
opinions for the truth, and most people don't really care to change
their minds. Furthermore, the sophists-the lawyers-actually deny
the distinction between truth and opinion. They care about winning
arguments, not getting the right answer; and, when Socrates shows
them that in reality they understand nothing, he wins nothing but
their hostility. In the end, they kill Socrates. (Stay tuned to find out
what happens to Rabbi Eliezer.) Plato's effort to ground the distinction between truth and opinion, and to expose the demagoguery of
the sophists, drives the argument of many of his most famous dialogues, the Gorgias, Protagoras, Republic, Sophist, Theaetetus,
Phaedrus, Laws, and-of course-the Apology, the trial of Socrates.
In the Oven of Akhnai story, Rabbi Joshua assumes the role of the
Sophist-his "It is not in heaven!" sounds remarkably similar to
Protagoras's "Man is the measure of all things"-and Eliezer plays
Socrates.
This Platonic and objectivist interpretation appears to be a
straightforward way of reading the Oven of Akhnai parable. But I
have not given the whole parable yet, and as we add more of the story
we will discover that this is not the only way of reading it. In the pages
that follow, I aim to explore some alternative readings of the fable,
each of which-I hope-sheds additional light on the problems of
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truth, authority, and interpretation that the story raises. Call the first
reading, the one I have just offered, the Platonic interpretation.In it,
Eliezer is the good guy, and Joshua represents the forces of authoritarian sophistry ranged against the good and the true.
III. GOD SMILED: THE HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION

The follow-up on the part of the story already told immediately
casts doubt on the Platonic interpretation.
[Some time later,I Rabbi Natan met Elijah [the prophet]. He asked
him: "What did the Holy One do at that moment?" [that is, the
moment when Rabbi Yehoshua said "It is not in heaven!"] Elijah
replied: "God smiled and said: 'My children have defeated me, my
children have defeated me." '' 6
God's amusement as He admits defeat is certainly one of the
most startling images in any monotheistic religious text I am aware of.
The philosopher Ted Cohen thinks that laughing at logical absurdities-absurdities like a group of rabbis disregarding God's will to win
a debate about its meaning-is closely connected with the roots of
Jewish humor.7 I do not know whether Cohen is right about the
unique Jewishness of making jokes based on logic pushed to the point
of absurdity, but he is certainly right that it fits in with a significant
strain within Jewish culture-and, I will argue, this is the strain that
corresponds most closely with contemporary secular legal culture.
A.

Cheder Culture and Debate

The Jews are the People of the Book, engaged in what historian
Paul Johnson once called a "great enterprise in social metaphysics," 8
namely organizing an entire way of life around a body of law spun out
of books by scholars and students studying and arguing together in a
cheder, a school. First among those books is the Torah, the Five
Books of Moses, and especially the laws given in the book of Deuteronomy. Taking the Torah, and the rest of the Hebrew Bible, as their
starting point, the rabbis created the Oral Torah, the corpus of elaborations and interpretations that a secular lawyer may think of as
6. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 (translating Bava Metzia *59b). Other translations
say that God laughed, not smiled, but the verb (chaich) means "to smile"; "to laugh" is izachek.
But I don't think anything turns on this point of translation. In both translations, the point is to
give God a sense of humor.
7. TED COHEN, JOKES: PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS ON JOKING MATTERS 45-68 (1999).
Cohen makes this point specifically about the Oven of Akhnai story. Id. at 57.
8. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 149 (1987).
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corresponding roughly to the common law or, in a civil law system,
the jurisprudence growing out of the civil code. In the second century,
some influential rabbis (led by Rabbi Judah the Prince) codified the
Oral Torah into a bulky legal treatise, the Mishnah. "Codified" and
"treatise" are not exactly the right words, however, because the
Mishnah is structured as a series of fragmentary arguments among
legendary rabbis, and frequently their arguments are left unresolved.
The original purpose of the Mishnah remains mysterious; no one
knows whether it was intended as a legal code, a schoolbook, or
something else entirely. 9 The Mishnah in its turn received oral elaboration, and three hundred years later some of these rabbinical debates
were recorded in the vast, multi-volume Babylonian Talmud. The
Mishnah and Talmud (together referred to collectively as "Gemara"),
plus a few other collections of rabbinic debates, became in their own
turn the source-books for the sprawling bodies of interpretations and
responsa that make up the Oral Torah, which to this day continues to
expand in observant communities.
Like the Mishnah, the Talmud takes the literary form of an
enormously elaborated dialogue among legendary rabbis. The Talmud proceeds through the Mishnah, clause by clause, with the rabbis
debating fine points of law and interpretation, and frequently going
off on tangents. Their debates, like those in the Mishnah itself, are
frequently left inconclusive.10 In the eleventh century, Rashi, the most
influential sage of the middle ages, wrote a line-by-line commentary
on the Talmud, and a group of Rashi's descendants wrote another.
Since then, every printed edition of the Talmud includes both commentaries, arranged around the margins of the pages so that the
commentaries surround the text. The visual appearance of the pages
is striking. A reader examining a page of the Talmud, with its text
surrounded by text surrounded by text will have little difficulty understanding the imagery of the Oven of Akhnai, with rabbis enwrapping the oven with discussions like a coiled snake. Each page is
printed in coils of argument. Thus, the entire Gemara, the central
legal source-book of traditional Judaism, takes the form not of a
hornbook but a dialogue, a never-ending polyphonic argument in an
idealized cheder. The text itself mirrors the form of life- self9. THE MISHNAH: A NEW TRANSLATION at xiii (Jacob Neusner trans., 1988) [hereinafter
MISHNAH NEW TRANSLATION].
10. For a useful discussion of the hermeneutic possibilities in this body of texts, see
MICHAEL FISHBANE, Law, Story, and Interpretation:Reading Rabbinic Texts, in AUTHORITY,

supra note 2, at xxxix.
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government through endless legal argument-to which it gave rise.
With no state of their own, no authority to enact enforceable legislation, and no police, Jewish communities in the Diaspora had only the
rabbis and the cheder to fall back upon.
Recognizing the centrality of the cheder as a social institution-it
is at once school, legal academy, parliament, and public forum -helps
us understand the amazing imagery of God smiling in delight as His
children defeat him at the game of dialectic. Of course the primary
imagery is of an indulgent parent smiling and conceding a point to a
well-loved, clever, argumentative child. But it is equally a scene from
a cheder with God as teacher. Every teacher will immediately recognize God's amused affection at Joshua and Jeremiah. A tennis coach
whose pupil wins a nifty point from her, a chess teacher whose student finds a winning move that the teacher overlooked, a law professor whose students notice something important in a judicial opinion
that the professor had never thought of, will all smile to themselves
and think "My children have defeated me!"-even if, or especially if,
the teacher knows that it isn't likely to happen again for quite a while.
God's response is, quite simply, a teacher's delight at the success of
the academic enterprise-the growing skill and independence of his
or her students.
This is, one might say, a humanistic, feel-good reading of the
Oven of Akhnai story, and for short I will refer to it as the humanistic
interpretation." Instead of a wrathful God who strikes down Rabbi
Joshua for spurning the divine voice, God chuckles indulgently at the
clever bit of dialectic that Joshua uses to trap the Almighty in His
own words. For of course what Joshua has done-at least as Rabbi
Jeremiah interprets him-is nothing more than pointing out that a
prior commandment of God, the "follow the majority" passage in
Exodus 23:2, has preempted the bat kol. A human cannot really defeat God. All that a human can do is appeal to God against Himself.
It's like the method for playing simultaneous chess against two powerful champions. Play the white pieces against one, and the black
pieces against the other. Place the champions in separate rooms. Observe the first champion's move with the white piece, then go into the
1 t. We find it, for example, in JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY 156 (1991). Rabbi
Telushkin's well-known pedagogic book quotes the scholar Hyam Maccobv: "This extraordinary story strikes the keynote of the Talmud. God is a good father who wants His children to
grow up and achieve independence." Id. Stone notes that Robert Burt adopts the humanistic
interpretation. Stone, supra note I, at 841-43 (citing Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in
Antonin Scalia'sJurisprudence,12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1691-92 n.31 (1991)).
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other room and play the identical move against the other champion.
Wait to see what he replies with the black pieces, then go back into
the first room and play that move against the first champion. In effect,
you are playing the two champions against each other, and you get at
least one win (or two draws) out of the games.
B.

Wit- Versus-Might Stories and the Rule of Law

Rabbi Joshua's method of using God's own rules to evade the
outcome dictated by the bat kol carries powerful resonance in Jewish
culture. A favorite genre within Diaspora Jewish folk-humor concerns the powerless Jew who outwits a powerful persecutor by trapping him in his own rules. One might call these wit-versus-might
stories. For example:
The Grand Inquisitor in Seville trumps up accusations
against Rabbi PInkhes, the leader of the Jewish community.
He orders a trial by divine will: the rabbi must draw one of
two rolled-up pieces of paper, with "guilty" and "innocent"
written on them, and if he draws the slip marked "guilty" he
will be executed. The whole town gathers to watch the spectacle. Secretly, the malicious Inquisitor writes "guilty' on
both pieces of paper. But the rabbi suspects that this is what
the Inquisitor has done, and when he draws his piece of paper, instead of reading it he immediately pops it in his mouth
and swallows it. The Inquisitor leaps to is feet in astonishment and anger. The rabbi calmly says, "Don't worry, your
excellency. You still have the other piece of paper, and trom
it you can learn the verdict. If it says 'innocent' I must have
chosen 'guilty'; and if it says 'guilty' then I must have chosen
2
'innocent."' Rabbi Pinkhes's quick thinking saves him.1
Or this one:
Zev Ben Shmuel has become a court jester in Babyloniauntil he imprudently responds in kind to an anti-Jewish insult
from a Babylonian nobleman, and under pressure from the
outraged nobleman the king reluctantly sentences him to
death. The king, however, grants Zev one final favor: he gets
to choose the manner of his death. "Hanging, poisoning, being devoured by wild beasts, anything you wish, we shall
carry it out." Zev replies, very simply, "Old age." To keep his
king releases Zev, and Zev indeed lives to a ripe
word, the
old age.1 3

12. NINA JAFFE & STEVE ZEITLIN, WHILE STANDING ON ONE FOOT: PUZZLE STORIES
AND WISDOM TALES FROM THE JEWISH TRADITION 7-10(1993).
13. Id. at 23-25.
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Or this:
A wicked caliph devises a plan to eliminate the Jews in his
kingdom. He instructs the guards to ask every Jew to say
something about himself. If he lies, they are told to behead
him; but if he tells the truth, they are to hang him. Benjamin,
a Moroccan Jew, comes to the kingdom on business, and the
guards seize him and order him to tell them something about
imself, explaining the caliph's murderous order with a malicious smirk. What does Benjamin reply to save himself?
The answer: he says, "Today you will behead me." Of course,
if they behead him he has told the truth, and they have disobeyed the caliph's orders to hang, not behead, the truthtellers. But they also disobey if they hang him, for hanging is
the fate reserved for truth-tellers, and he hasn't told the
truth. The only way they can avoid disobedience is to do neither, and Benjamin hastily returns to Morocco with his life
14
intact.
Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of similar stories and jokes exist, all
set in the framework of the persecution and oppression of Diaspora
Jews.
As the last story illustrates, they fit in with a familiar modern
genre of logic puzzles. Logician and puzzle-master Raymond
Smullyan offers a typical example (which I mention now because we
shall return to it later). The king in the Arabian Nights grows tired of
Scheherazade's stories and announces that he must now execute her.
The quick-witted Scheherazade makes a last request: "'I will ask you
a question,' said Scheherazade, 'a question answerable by yes or no.
All that I ask is that you answer yes or no, and that you promise to
answer truthfully."'15 Confronted with such a seemingly-harmless request, the king gives his word. Scheherazade then poses her question,
and as he works out the answer, the king discovers (to his own secret
delight) that to keep his word he cannot execute her. What is
Scheherazade's question? (Before reading the answer in the footnote,
you may want to try your hand at solving the puzzle.16 ) Obviously,
14. Id. at 34-37. The greatest of all these stories, however, is the tale of Bert and the Priest.
in COHEN, supra note 7, at 91-94. It is too lengthy to reproduce here, so I'm afraid you have no
alternative but to find a copy of Cohen's book (which has a lot of great jokes in it, as well as
many interesting thoughts about the significance of jokes).
15. RAYMOND SMULLYAN, THE RIDDLE OF SCHEHERAZADE AND OTHER AMAZING
PUZZLES, ANCIENT AND MODERN 79 (1997).
16. One question that works is this: "Will you answer this question no and take my life?"
On purely logical grounds, the king cannot answer "yes," because then his answer to the "will
you answer this question no?" clause would be false. And if he answers "no" and executes her,
he will likewise have broken his word: his answer to the entire two-part question would be false.
Thus the only way to keep his word is to answer "no" and spare Scheherazade. Id. at 223. The
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Smullyan's Scheherazade story is nothing but a wit-versus-might story
in which the clever Jew is disguised in clever-Arab-princess' clothing.
What is striking about the wit-versus-might stories is that they
merge so seamlessly with the cheder culture of legalism, rules, and
argument. Of course, nothing actually prevents the Inquisitor from
ordering the rabbi's death-nothing except his own word and his own
rules. The Diaspora Jew, without an army or a martial culture, has
just one weapon to use against the oppressor: his wits, sharpened by
hundreds of hours of cheder dialectic, coupled with the weak commitment of his oppressor to maintain at least a semblance of respect
for the rules of law and of logic. If the chief virtue of a rule-of-law
culture lies in substituting rational debate for violence, in order to
protect the weak, then the wit-versus-might stories represent the rule
of law in microcosm. And Rabbi Jeremiah's interpretation of Joshua's
"It is not in heaven!", with its dialectical trick of pre-empting the bat
kol with the Torah, may stand as a kind of paean to the humanizing
power of the rule of law. (Of course, in this story God is not a malicious oppressor, and his reaction is delighted amusement and not the
Inquisitor's frustrated rage.)
C.

Truth as Coercion

The humanistic interpretation of the Oven of Akhnai story displays Rabbi Eliezer in an entirely different light from the Platonic
interpretation. In the Platonic interpretation, Eliezer was Socrates
confronting authoritarian sophists. In the humanistic interpretation,
Eliezer is the true authoritarian. When he fails to convince the other
rabbis with arguments, he resorts to magic and brute force. The dead
giveaway is his third miracle: "If the Halakhah accords with me, let
the walls of the study hall prove it," at which point the walls begin to
collapse on the rabbis. In his growing anger and frustration, Eliezer
resorts to physical threats; like the blind Samson, he prepares to bring
the building down on the rabbis' heads. Symbolically, he attempts to
demolish the entire practice of dialectic and argument, of give and
take within the culture. 7 The walls of the cheder, which the tale tells
question "Will you either answer this question no or spare my life?" does the job equally well:
the answer "no" is false because its truth logically contradicts the first clause of the question,
while the answer "yes" can be truthful only if he spares her life. Id. at 222-23.
17. Scott Shapiro's interpretation of the Oven of Akhnai emphasizes a similar point:
Elicier manifested a vice that is not uncommon among the pious, a vice which might
be called "excessive purism." Excessive purists always insist on acting in the technically
right manner. They refuse to corrupt themselves, to dirty their hands by descending to
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us are leaning to this day
Eliezer's command and
metaphor for the edifice
countervailing pressures

under the countervailing pressures of Rabbi
Rabbi Joshua's rebuke, offer a powerful
of the law, whose crookedness reflects the
of force and argument, violence and the

word.18

The sequence of miracles escalates step by step. First, Eliezer
displays a single act of power, uprooting and transporting a tree.
When this fails to convince the rabbis, he reverses the flow of watera less gaudy miracle than uprooting the tree, but a more impressive
one: he has reversed the course of nature, not simply displayed a single act of might. Then comes the collapsing schoolhouse, with its sinister implication of violence against the other rabbis. But none of
these move the rabbis, because, as they observe, you can't prove a
point of law with a carob tree or an aqueduct or even the destruction
of the schoolhouse.
But what about the bat kol? The fact is that even the bat kol presents no arguments on the merits of the legal issue-it asserts
Eliezer's personal authority by fiat, not reason. ("The law is always as
he says.") Of course, one might reply that Eliezer has already offered
"all the arguments in the world," and the bat kol has no need
to repeat them, merely to announce once and for all that they are right.
But the fact remains that the bat kol has cut the Gordian knot of
coiled arguments with a peremptory announcement. This is truth as
coercion. As Hannah Arendt observed in a remarkable essay on truth
and politics: "Truth carries within itself an element of coercion," because propositions "once perceived as true.., have in common that
they are beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent." 9 That
seems to be what Eliezer aims for when he invokes the bat kol.

the level of the lumpenproletariat and to act as the benighted do. However, ....
one can
have reasons to abide by the will of another, even when one knows that they are
wrong. To loftily stay above the fray can manifest extreme disrespect for one's fellow
citizens.
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 439. Shapiro's argument differs from the one I offer here, however. He
argues that deferring to the majority enhances their autonomy; it "pays respect to the importance that people are allotted a certain control over their lives and the fairness of sharing that
power equally." Id. at 438.
18. One thinks of Holmes's argument that a judge's job is "to express... the resultant...
of the pressure of the past and the conflicting wills of the present." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., Twenty Years in Retrospect, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL

HOLMES 154, 156 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1962).
19.

HANNAH

ARENDT,

Truth and Politics, in

BETWEEN

PAST AND

FUTURE:

EIGHT

EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 227, 239-40 (rev. ed. 1968); see also Nozick, supra note 5.
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Stuart Hampshire draws a useful distinction between two forms
of human reason. One, modeled on mathematical proof, is "a process
in the inner consciousness of the solitary thinker, '20 and it consists of
deductions that logically compel the thinker to specific conclusions.
The other is modeled on publicdebate, the back-and-forth weighing
of competing standpoints aiming at persuasion (not compulsion) and
culminating in a decision that logic alone cannot dictate. During
childhood we learn the practices of debate in family scenes "of asserting, contradicting, deciding, predicting, recalling, approving and disapproving, admiring, blaming, rejecting and accepting, and many
more."21 We learn to internalize these practices, and "[d]iscussions in
the inner forum of an individual mind naturally duplicate in form and
structure the public adversarial discussions. '22 Hampshire and Arendt
are both eager to restore equal dignity to the latter form of rationality, the public-dialogical form, rather than following the Cartesian
philosophical tradition by focusing exclusively on mathematical demonstration as the paradigm of reason. 23 The hallmark of publicdialogic reasoning is the recognition of human plurality and of the
need to reach conclusions by means other than blowing away the
other side with arguments that simply cannot be contradicted. A
Midrash (commentary) on the Psalms, celebrating the polyphony
inherent in the Law, expresses this point of view as a metaphysical
fact about legal texts:
Rabbi Yannai said: The clauses of the Torah were not given as
clear-cut [edicts]. Rather, concerning each clause that the Holy One
imparted to Moses, He would impart forty-nine reasons to [rule]
"pure" and forty-nine reasons to [rule] "impure."
[Moses] said before Him: Master of the Universe, how long? Let us
clarify the matter!
He answered: "Follow the majority!" If the majority
24 rule "impure,"
it is impure; if the majority rule "pure," it is pure.
In these terms, the rabbis in the Oven of Akhnai parable are engaging in the form of reasoning appropriate to human affairs, the collective give-and-take of argument culminating in a majority decision;
20. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 11 (2000).

21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Of course, the distinction cannot be as stark as Hampshire suggests: public debates
include logical argumentation, and (conversely) sound arguments anticipate and answer potential objections. But notwithstanding the overlap, I believe that the distinction makes intuitive
sense.
24. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 317 (quoting Midrash Psalms 12).
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it is Eliezer who wants to short-circuit and trump human rationality
by substituting divine warrant. As Arendt argues,
The trouble is that ... truth.., peremptorily claims to be acknowledged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of political life. The modes of thought and communication
that deal with truth, if seen from the political perspective, are necessarily domineering; they don't take into account other people's
opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly
25
political thinking.
One obvious question arises: why should we accept political
thinking about the interpretation of the law rather than insisting on
truthful thinking? Implicitly, the Oven of Akhnai story answers this
question in Rabbi Joshua's proclamation of the line from Deuteronomy: "It is not in Heaven!" Let us examine the context of this line,
which appears during the covenant between the Children of Israel
and God at Moab:
Surely, this Instruction [mitzvah] which I enjoin upon you this day
is not too baffling for you, nor is it beyond reach. It is not in
heaven, that you should say, "Who among us can go up to heaven
and get it for us, and impart it to us, that we may observe it?" Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, "Who among us can
cross to the other side of the sea and get it for us and impart it to us,
that we may observe it?" No, the thing is very close to you, in your
mouth and in your heart, to observe it.26
In effect, Moses is saying that the law is fundamentally transparent. It is not an esoteric teaching meant only for initiates or prophets
or experts. (Oddly enough, it's the Bible, not Justice Holmes, that
first informs us that the law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky.) In the Oven of Akhnai story, Joshua reasons in reverse from this
passage: any interpretation of the law that cannot persuade the rabbis
without the intervention of a bat kol cannot be the law as Moses
describes it, namely a law that is not in heaven. The law, one might
say, cannot be too fancy for ordinary people to grasp, or else it isn't
the law.27 And if a legal proposition cannot persuade the rabbis with-

25.
26.

ARENDT, supra note 19, at 241.
AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 16 (quoting Deuteronomy 30:11-14).

27. This argument has some affinities to Daniel Farber's critique of brilliance in legal
theory:
Most theories of constitutional law rest on some notion of the consent of the governed,
either through tacit institutional acquiescence or through some kind of social contract
theory. A brilliant theory is by definition one that would not occur to most people. It is
hard to see how the vast majority of the population can be presumed to have agreed to
something that they could not conceive of. Who would know better than the average
person what the average person has consented to? How can someone have consented
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out the intervention of a bat kol, it is too fancy for ordinary people to
grasp. Ergo, it isn't the law.
D. Jeremiah'sSophism
Jeremiah explicates Joshua's argument differently, and I turn
next to his explication. 8 It is really in his further interpretation that
the rabbis work their logical trick on God. According to Jeremiah, the
reason for ignoring the bat kol is that the Torah was already given at
Mount Sinai, and the Torah states that one must follow the majority.
Hence, even if the bat kol states that the majority is wrong, the prior
injunction to follow the majority provides an exclusionary reason to
disregard the bat kol.
To complete the argument, one would have to show why the injunction to follow the majority takes priority over the bat kol, that is,
why it is an exclusionary reason, and also why the injunction applies
even when the majority is demonstrably wrong. But trouble arises
even apart from these worries. The trouble is that Jeremiah's argument rips the words "follow the majority" out of a context that in fact
says exactly the opposite. The full passage in the Torah from which29he
is quoting reads: "You shall not follow the majority to do wrong. It
appears, then, as though Jeremiah has not defeated the Master of the
World with an ingenious point of logic, but rather that he has prevailed by cheating.
One response to this objection is that Jeremiah's interpretive
method -plucking words out of context regardless of its meaning and
spinning law out of them-is a traditional technique of Jewish hermeneutics. Rabbi Akiva was said to derive rulings from a single letter of

to a position that is so novel and clever that only one person on earth has ever thought
of it?
Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 925 (1986). Some might
say that this argument cannot apply to non-consensual divine commandments- but it is significant that the "not in heaven" passage occurs during the course of a covenant between the Israelites and God, and indeed, Judaism as a covenantal religion locates the binding force of the law
in consent, not command. See AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 6-46. However, Joshua relies on the
"not in heaven" paragraph, not the notion of consent, to demonstrate that legal interpretations
unpersuasive to the rabbis absent divine intervention cannot really be the law. His argument is
therefore parallel to. not identical with, Farber's.
28. The Artscroll edition interpolates language stating that this explication is Joshua's, not
Jeremiah's. Artscroll Talmud, Bava Metzia, supra note 2, at 59b'. I follow the translation in
AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264, as well as the Soncino Talmud, supra note 2, both of which
attribute the paragraph to Jeremiah. Follow the majority.
29. See AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 n.9, 317 (quoting Exodus 23:2).
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a single word in the Torah. 30 In effect, the rabbis treated the words
and phrases of the Torah not as a text demanding a sympathetic reading, but rather as a repository of language-fragments, a kind of lexicon or even alphabet providing the raw material for legal rulings.
Perhaps a better metaphor would be that the phrases of the Torah
resemble a set of musical motifs that interpreters weave into their
compositions, like Wagner writing his operas or jazz players jamming.
The rabbis would not have described the Torah as a lexicon.
They would have said that because the Torah comes directly from
God, nothing about it can be contingent or accidental. Every letter of
every word is exactly what it must be, every fragment conveys its own
truth, and so the interpreter is entitled to whatever inferences can be
drawn from the fragments considered singly.31 The high-water mark
of this kind of Torah-mysticism is the peculiar interpretive technique
known as Gematria, a method used by the medieval kabbalists to
discover secret meanings in the Torah. Every letter of the alphabet
corresponds with a number, and kabbalistic numerology permitted
intersubstitution in the text of the Torah of any word with the same
number as a word in the original text. The practice rested on the absolute non-contingency of the Torah-if the word behemah (beast)
has the numerical value 52, that cannot be an accident according to
the kabbalists-and this Torah mysticism likewise provides a metaphysical justification for the rabbis' peculiar hermeneutic practice of
wrenching verbal fragments of the Torah (such as "follow the majority") out of their context. 32 I take it that this metaphysical-mystical
justification has no secular counterpart, and is therefore of little
interest to secular legal theory.
However, there is a less occult justification for Jeremiah's appropriation of the clause "follow the majority" that does indeed have a
more universal theoretical significance. The full phrase, "You shall
not follow the majority to do wrong," raises the obvious question of
how we are to know when the majority is wrong. What standard other
than the opinion of the majority do we have for making that determination? In the Book of Exodus, there is an answer to this question,
namely that Moses the prophet is in direct communication with God,
and transmits the divine word directly to the Israelites. Maimonides
30.

AUTHORITY, supra note 2. at 262.
31. See Stone, supra note 1, at 864.
32. See GERSHOM SCHOLEM, KABBALAH 168-74, 337-43 (1974) (discussing kabbalistic
theory of the Torah and Gematria, respectively).
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argued that the prophecy of Moses was a unique, epistemically privileged moment in Jewish history, the moment when God's will was
made transparent to the Israelites. 33 But the Mosaic period is over,
and it will never be replicated. That, at any rate, is the standard reading of the final sentence of the Torah:
Never again did there arise in Israel a prophet like Moses-whom
the Lord singled out, face to face, for the various signs and portents
that the Lord sent him to display in the land of Egypt, against
Pharaoh and all his courtiers and his whole country, and for all the
and awesome power that Moses displayed before all
great might
Israel. 34
To be sure, the Bible recognizes other prophets who arose in the
land of Israel, but none provided the direct line to God that Moses
did, and eventually the line of prophecy petered out.35 If the Mosaic
period represented a kind of epistemic golden age, then the period of
the later prophets was an age of silver, and we now dwell in the age of
bronze or clay. In the age of bronze, lacking a Moses, or even an
Amos or Isaiah, there remains no better guide to right and wrong
than the majority opinion of the wisest and most learned sages, the
hakhamim.
Not that the hakhamim regarded their own deliberations as
third-rate knowledge. An extraordinary Talmudic passage states explicitly that sages are superior to prophets, and even to the Torah
itself.36 Jeremiah does not go that far, of course, because it is the Torah that he cites as authority for disregarding the bat kol; but there
seems to be little doubt that Jeremiah is rejecting the claims of
prophecy to prevail over the debates of the sages. We may gloss
Jeremiah's seemingly-perverse wrenching of "follow the majority"
out of its original "do not follow the majority" context as an elliptical
argument along the following lines:

33. See the discussion of prophecy in AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 225-31 (quoting
Maimonides' Mishneh Torah).
34. THE TORAH: THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES 405 (1962) (quoting Deuteronomy 34:1012).
35. See the passage on the decline of prophecy in AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 257-58
(quoting Tosefta Sotah).
36. On the superiority of the sages to the prophets, see AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 25859 (translating Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra *12a-b), and the explication of this passage by
the twelfth-century rabbi Joseph ibn Migash, id. at 259-60. On the superiority of the sages to the
Torah itself, see id. at 261-62 (translating Midrash Rabbah: Song of Songs 1:2 and Babylonian
Talmud, Menahot *29b) (the latter is a remarkable passage in which God miraculously sets
Moses down in Rabbi Akiva's Talmudic academy, and Moses discovers that he lacks the skills to
follow the scholars' subtle debates about the meaning of the Torah).
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In Mosaic times, the commandment against following the majority in wrong was perfectly coherent because the prophecy
of Moses provided transparent access to knowledge of right
and wrong. But without the direct line to the Divine Word
provided uniquely by Moses, and never replicated, the negative implication of the rule is that now we have no alternative
to following the majority of the sages, because their debates
remain the most reliable procedure for determining right and
wrong.
On this reading, the bat kol has arrived on the scene too late, in an
epoch when prophecy no longer counts as the right method of discerning the law.
One other aspect of the Oven of Akhnai story reinforces this
reading. Rabbi Eliezer's sequence of miracles seems rather clearly
modeled on the series of miracles that God commands Moses to perform in Egypt to persuade the Israelites of his authenticity (Exodus
4:1-9). But, the story intimates, Eliezer is no Moses. So the point of
the parallel is that we don't live in Deuteronomic times, but rather in
times when God's will is hidden and we must make do with purely
human forms of legal reasoning. Even though the law is divine, we
must behave as though we are secular interpreters, not miracleworkers or seers.
It might be objected that Eliezer's miracles do offer evidence
that his interpretation of the law is correct. Human beings cannot
uproot carob trees, reverse the flow of water, collapse the walls of a
house, or summon up divine voices merely by their say-so. Hence,
Eliezer must be assisted by supernatural forces, and when he says, "If
the law agrees with me, these miracles will prove it," God evidently
answers his prayers and validates his claims.
But not only does the Oven of Akhnai story explicitly state that
miracles don't prove points of law, it subtly casts doubt on the power
of miracles to prove anything. Consider the peculiar aside that appears, almost tongue in cheek, when the Talmud recounts Eliezer's
first miracle. "The carob jumped a hundred cubits. (Some say: four
hundred cubits.)" Why the second sentence? One answer is surely
that by means of this literary device the narrator of the story (the
stam, the anonymous teacher in the Talmud) makes it clear that he
wasn't there, and that the story has come down to us in multiple versions. It is a distancing device, a device to remind the reader that the
story is, after all, just a story. In addition, though, the disagreement
over how far the carob tree jumped suggests that the perceptions of
the eye-witnesses diverged. It reminds us that tales of miracles are
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themselves infected by human fallibility in perception and memory.
In effect, it reminds us that the proof-power of miracles cannot rise
higher than the fallible perceptions of the observers. As Hume argued, precisely because a miracle is an interruption of the ordinary
course of nature, it is always just as probable that my own perception
has inexplicably failed as it is that the course of nature has inexplicably failed; and so miracles can never carry their own epistemic warrant.3 7 It follows (as both Hume and Kierkegaard argue) that the
interpretation of any observational evidence as a miracle, a divine
intervention, is a matter of faith and not of fact, and that will be
equally true for eyewitnesses and for those who receive their testimony second- or third-hand.38 The facts of human fallibility and human disagreement cannot be evaded except by a leap of faith that
undermines the power of the miracle to prove anything at all.
These arguments, unlike the metaphysical-mystical justification
for "follow the majority," do have importance and resonance for legal
theorists. On this way of reading the Oven of Akhnai story, its point
seems to be that fallible human beings have no more reliable guide to
the correct interpretation of law than their own collective deliberations and votes-even under the strong assumption that in God's eyes
every question arising under the law has exactly one right answer.
Jeremy Waldron has argued precisely this point (convincingly, to my
mind) in connection with the view of some natural lawyers that law
has to do with objective moral truth. Waldron points out that the objectivity of moral truth is largely beside the point because no agreedupon method exists for determining moral truth.3 9 Dworkin's rightanswer thesis, even if true, settles nothing. As Arendt puts it, truth
appears in the market place under the guise of opinion. 4° That is, even
if morality is a matter of objective truth and not opinion, the lack of
methods for ascertaining the truth means that we will never do better
than debating different people's opinions about what the objective
truth is, then settling the matter by some non-truth-related method
like voting. If it is not in heaven, "follow the majority" seems more
reliable than the rule "follow the objective truth," because what I
37.

DAVID

HUME,

ENQUIRIES

CONCERNING

THE

HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING

AND

CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 114-16 (L. A. Selby Bigge ed., 1902).
38. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS 126-32 (David Swenson trans.

1962).
39. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158,
171-77 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
40. ARENDT, supra note 19, at 238.
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take to be the objective truth may simply be my own mistaken opinion.

41

IV. THE POWER INTERPRETATION
A.

The Rabbis as Grand Inquisitors

There is another way to look at the story, however, which comes
to the fore when we read its continuation. What happens next after
God smiles and says "My children have defeated me"? The story continues:
It is related that on that day the rabbis collected everything that
Rabbi Eli'ezer had pronounced pure and burned it in a fire. Then
they voted on him and placed him under the ban [i.e., excommuni42
cated him].

So much for the feel-good, humanistic cheder. The rabbis are
playing hardball. After the vote to excommunicate Eliezer, Rabbi
Akiva insists on communicating the news to him personally, in order
to put it in the gentlest, most delicate way.
They said: who will go and inform him? R'Akiva said to them: I will
go, for I am concerned that perhaps an unfit person will go and inform him and bring about the destruction of the entire world. What
did R'Akiva do to inform R'Eliezer? He dressed in black clothing,
and cloaked himself in black, and sat before [R'Eliezer] at a distance of four amos. R'Eliezer said to him: Akiva, why is today different from other days? Why are you sitting so far away from me
today? [R'Akiva] replied to him: My teacher, it seems to me that
your colleagues are removed from you. 4 3

Rather than, "you are excommunicated by your colleagues." A
nice touch, perhaps, but the effect is nevertheless devastating.
[Rabbi Eli'ezer] tore his clothes and took off his shoes and sat
down on the ground. Tears fell from his eyes; then the world was
afflicted: one third of the olives, one third of the wheat, one third of

41. This is a different argument than that implicit in the Midrash on the Psalms, supra note
24, which is a metaphysical claim that there is no objectively right answer to any legal question,
because "the clauses of the Torah were not given as clear-cut edicts." Waldron's is an argument
about the inherent inability of human beings to agree on objective moral truths; the Midrash's is
an argument about the inherent plurality of moral truth.
42. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 (translating Bava Metzia, *59b).
43. Artscroll Talmud, supra note 2, at 59b2 (translating Bava Metzi, *59b). (I have switched
translations here because the passage in question was elided from the translation I have used for
the rest of the story.)
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the barley .... It is said: "There was great woe that day, for every

spot toward which Rabbi Eli'ezer directed his eyes was burned."44
The affront against divine truth is not so easily dispensed with;
the world itself is diminished. The imagery of the affliction is remarkable. The first image, of the destruction of olives, wheat, and barley,
seems to respond to the prophecy of Deuteronomy 11:13-17: If you
disobey the divine law, "the Lord's anger will flare up against you,
and He will shut up the skies so that there will be no rain and the
ground will not yield its produce; and you will soon perish from the
good land that the Lord is assigning you. '45 By overruling the Torah
in its correct meaning, the rabbis have diminished it, and the sustenance of the people diminishes correspondingly.
As for the image of Eliezer's fatal gaze, his excommunication
emphasizes once again Eliezer's role as truth-finder and truth-keeper.
The law follows Eliezer, and, correspondingly, the world mirrors
Eliezer. His inner devastation is total, and everywhere he looks he
perceives only devastation. The outer world mirrors his inner world;
wherever his eyes rest is incinerated, because Eliezer's inner world
has itself gone up in flames.
The paradox of authority, the naked assertion by authorities of
their right to be wrong, has returned with a vengeance. Only now the
issue is not the truth-versus-opinion, few-versus-many tensions in the
Platonic interpretation. Now we confront the nasty, political side of
authority, the infliction of real punishments on those who choose to
defy the authorities. Eliezer's pain and humiliation are real, and it
emphasizes how ruthlessly the rabbis suppress dissent. The story says
that they gathered every object that Eliezer has declared pure and
burned it-an image uncomfortably like the book-burnings of the
Inquisition. The rabbis burn these objects knowing full well that the
bat kol has declared them pure, so there is no need for the bonfire
other than the need to assert their authority and extinguish Eliezer's.
Striking parallels exist between the Oven of Akhnai parable and
one of the deepest reflections on Christianity, Dostoevsky's "Grand
Inquisitor" story in The Brothers Karamazov. In this story, Christ
returns to Earth in Spain during the time of the Inquisition. He works
miracles and "rays of Light, Enlightenment, and Power stream from

44. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 (translating Bava Metzia, *59b).
45. Deuteronomy 11:13-17, The Torah 357 (Jewish Publication Society trans.). These
verses are recited by observant Jews three times a day, as part of the shema, the basic affirmation of faith.
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his eyes and, pouring over the people, shake their hearts with responding love."' 46 The Grand Inquisitor orders Christ arrested. That
night, the Inquisitor visits Christ in his cell. He admonishes Christ to
be silent.
[Y]ou have no right to add anything to what you already said once.
Why, then, have you come to interfere with us? For you have come
to interfere with us and you know it yourself. But do you know
what will happen tomorrow?... [T]omorrow I shall condemn you
and burn you at the stake as the most evil of heretics, and the very
people who today kissed your feet, tomorrow, at a nod from me,
will rush to heap the coals up around your stake ....

41

Ivan Karamazov, who recounts the story of the Grand Inquisitor,
imagines how his soliloquy continues.
"Everything," they say, "has been handed over by you [i.e., by
Christ] to the pope, and you may as well not come at all now, or at
least don't interfere with us [the Church] for the time being....
Have you the right to proclaim to us even one of the mysteries of
that world from which you have come?... No, you have not, so as
not to add to what has already been said once.... [Flortunately, on
your departure, you handed the work over to us. You promised,
you established with your word, you gave us the right to bind and
loose, and surely you cannot even think of taking this right away
'48
from us now. Why, then, have you come to interfere with us?"

The parallels to the Oven of Akhnai are obvious: once God has
laid down His law, and created temporal authorities to administer it,
He is not permitted to interfere with them. If He speaks through
Rabbi Eliezer, Eliezer must be excommunicated. If He sends His own
Son a second time, the priests must burn Him at the stake. The Grand
Inquisitor story makes manifest the political authoritarianism that is
latent in the Oven of Akhnai. For the Inquisitor makes it perfectly
clear that in his view the ultimate issue is the need for authoritarianism: "nothing has ever been more insufferable for man and for human
society than freedom,"49 which Jesus advocated and the Church, after
centuries of effort, was finally able to suppress. It is well-known that
Dostoevsky's inspiration for the Grand Inquisitor was the remarkable
right-wing French publicist Joseph de Maistre, an extreme ultramontanist (that is, a proponent of absolute Church authority over tempo46. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 249 (Richard Pevear & Larissa
Volokhonsky trans., 1990).
47. Id. at 250.
48. Id. at 251.
49. Id. at 252. The Inquisitor adds, "There is no more ceaseless or tormenting care for man,
as long as he remains free, than to find someone to bow down to as soon as possible." Id. at 254.
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ral as well as religious matters), and perhaps the ultimate nineteenthcentury authoritarian, who exulted in authoritarian government as an
antidote to human willfulness. 50
It is obvious that the Inquisitor represents only one extreme
strand of Catholicism, even conservative Catholicism; and of course
there are obvious differences between the hierarchical structure of
Catholicism, with one centralized authority, and the radically dispersed structure of rabbinic Judaism, with its endless collegial debates
in hundreds of communities and schools. But there is no denying that
traditional rabbis were and are fanatically jealous of their own
authority and ruthless in their efforts to defend it. This is glaringly
obvious in the religious politics of modern Israel, where the ultraorthodox rabbis have fought with every political tool at their command to suppress other strands of Judaism (and sometimes to battle
each other).51
It is a mistake to equate authoritarianism with traditionalism.
Rather, the debate over authoritarianism recurs throughout the history of the tradition; it is a debate within traditionalism itself. To take
a particularly stark example, at one point the Jerusalem Talmud takes
the anti-authoritarian stance: "Can it be the case that if they [the
court] say to you that right is left and left is right, you should obey
them? Scripture therefore teaches us 'to the right or to the left' (Deut.
17:11)-that... right is right and left is left. ' '52 But Rashi, in the eleventh century, takes the authoritarian side: "'To the right or to the left'
(Deut. 17:11). Even if they tell you that right is left and left is right,
obey them. ' '53 Two centuries later, Nahmanides, an equally celebrated
sage, defended Rashi's authoritarian dictum on the grounds that
without court-imposed unanimity "the Torah will become several

50. Maistre is most remembered for his paean to executioners: "JAIll grandeur, all power,
all subordination rests on the executioner: he is the horror and the bond of human association.
Remove this incomprehensible agent from the world, and at that very moment order gives way
to chaos, thrones topple, and society disappears." JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, The Saint Petersburg
Dialogues: First Dialogue, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 183, 192 (Jack Lively trans.,
1971).
51. 1 recall walking past the main school of reform Judaism in Jerusalem; the front gate had
the word Shatan (Satan) spray-painted across it by ultra-orthodox vandals. A reform rabbi
remarked to me in Jerusalem that Israel is the only country in the world where it is legal to
discriminate against Jews-for the ultra-orthodox parties have succeeded in building their own
preeminence into the laws of the state.
52. AUTHORITY. supra note 2, at 322 (translating Jerusalem Talmud Horayot *45d).
53. Id. at 333 (translating Rashi, Sifre Deuteronomy 154).
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Torahs. ''1 4 But in the year 930, an anti-rabbinite wrote: "When they
say, 'Rabbi So-and-so said thus-and-so,' I answer and say, I, too, am
the learned So-and-so."55 These striking examples represent a longstanding debate within traditional Judaism over the legitimacy of dissent and pluralism. 56 (This is not the same as the equally longstanding
debate over the legitimacy of legal innovation; indeed, the two debates run perpendicular to each other. Anti-authoritarians sometimes
criticize innovation because the power to innovate rests solely with
the rabbinical courts: Leone Modena, writing in the early seventeenth
century, asks "how [else] would the sages and Patriarchs lord it over
their generation if there were no innovation and casuistry. .? 57Two
hundred years later, Moses Sofer, a rabbinic authoritarian, counterattacks against the innovations of the haskalah, the anti-authoritarian
Jewish Enlightenment, by insisting, "The principle is, Anything new is
everywhere forbidden by the Torah."5 8 Both innovation and conservatism-a secular American reader might substitute dichotomies like
judicial activism/judicial restraint or living-constitution/strict construction-can be given either authoritarian or anti-authoritarian
polarities.)
B.

Coercive Logic

The Oven of Akhnai story, on the current reading, represents a
defense of rabbinic authoritarianism, even against God Himself. It
seems especially noteworthy that Rabbis Joshua and Jeremiah use a
logical trick to compel God to leave their authority intact-in effect,
they use logic to neutralize God. Earlier I gave an example of a logic
puzzle by Raymond Smullyan, the trick by which Scheherazade
forced the king not to execute her. Reflecting on the puzzle, Smullyan
writes: "The question Scheherazade had asked the king had an almost
magical quality in that it forced him to do something he wouldn't oth-

54. Id. at 334 (translating Nahmanides (Moses ben Nahman), Commentary on the Torah,
Deuteronomy 17:11).
55. Id. at 348 (translating Salmon ben Jeroham, Book of the Wars of the Lord, Cantos I11).
56. See the many selections on this subject in AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 244-378. If it
has not already become apparent, this is a suitable moment for me to acknowledge that it would
have been impossible to write this paper without this magnificent book, the first of four projected volumes surveying the Jewish political tradition, with newly translated selections and
commentaries by distinguished political philosophers.
57. Id. at 289 (translating Leone Modena (attrib.), Kol Sakhal, Second Essay, Chapter 5).
58. Id. at 295 (translating Moses Sofer, Responsa Hatam Soler, Orah Hayyim 1:28).
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erwise have done-namely, to spare her life." 59 Smullyan labels
statements and questions that force people to do things coercive
logic,60 and he offers many amusing examples.61 The name "coercive
logic" seems entirely apt, and it suggests that in the Oven of Akhnai
the two rabbis are trying to coerce God Himself, in order to free the
field of action for their own exertion of authority over Eliezer and the
rest of the community.
How can logic coerce God? All coercive logic puzzles share the
same underlying structure: the target promises to abide by a seemingly-innocuous verbal rule (like "answer a yes-no question truthfully" in Scheherezade's stratagem), and then the coercer embeds a
description of an action (the one the coercer wants the target to take)
in a sentence cleverly constructed so that logical deduction applied to
the sentence, under the rules the target has agreed to, yields the actdescription as a consequence. The mechanism of coercion is also the
same in all coercive logic puzzles: the moral compulsion of the victim's promise joins with the logical compulsion of the inference to
force the victim's hand. Obviously, logic alone cannot compel action-but logic together with a promise can compel action provided
that the victim is willing to speak consistently and keep his promise.
The entire practice of courtroom argumentation, to the extent that it
employs logical argument rather than rhetoric, amounts to little more
than an extended exercise in coercive logic. Without coercive logic,
the rule of law would have no essential connection with reason, at
least in its deductive form.

59.

SMULLYAN, supra note 15, at 85.

60. Id.
61. Here are two. Smullyan tells us that in his logic classes he used to lay a penny and a
quarter on the desk in front of him. He would then call on a student to say something. If it were
true, the student would receive one of the coins (Smullyan would decide which one); otherwise,
the student would receive nothing. Smullyan observes that there is a statement the student can
utter that will force Smullyan to give him or her the quarter; apparently, the point of the lesson
is to get students to discover that statement. However, he eventually decided to abandon this
teaching trick when he suddenly realized that a truly clever student could, with an appropriate
statement, force Smullyan to give the student a million dollars. What are the two statements?
(Try working it out before looking at the answers in the next paragraph.) Id. at 89-90.
The first statement: "You will not give me the penny." It can't be false, because then
the truth must be that Smullyan will give the student the penny, which he would only do if the
statement were true, not false. Because the statement cannot be false, it must be true, so
Smullyan must give the student a coin, and-because the statement is true-it cannot be the
penny. Ergo, Smullyan has to give the student the quarter. The second statement: "You will give
me neither the penny, nor the quarter, nor a million dollars." Work out for yourself why
Smullyan must then give the student a million dollars. Id. at 93.
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In the Oven of Akhnai, God's promise is clear. It appears in
God's covenant with Israel, or rather in the series of covenants by
which the Israelites bound themselves to the Torah and, reciprocally,
God promised to be their God and allow them to thrive if they hewed
to the Torah but to punish them if they deviated. Hence the priority
that the two rabbis assign to the Torah and its injunction to follow the
majority over the bat kol. And the logical trick is equally clear: to
obey God speaking through the bat kol is to disobey the Torah, and
thus they can obey God only by disregarding the bat kol. The result is
a case of coercive logic: Jeremiah's point is that God has promised to
reward them for hewing to the Torah, and the Torah says, in effect,
"Follow the majority and disregard anything that contradicts the majority-including a bat kol." And the net outcome of the story is a
pair of stratagems by which the rabbis secure their authority by neutralizing God through coercive logic and excommunicating the dissident Eliezer.
Alongside the Platonic interpretation and the humanistic interpretation, we now have the power interpretation of the Oven of
Akhnai. Rather than a reflection on truth and opinion, or a vindication of deliberative processes, the story represents a vindication of
rabbinic power through craft and compulsion. It is a political story,
one might almost say a public-choice story, and not a very nice one.
In this connection, we may reflect that the Talmud is itself the product of rabbinic Judaism, and the fact that the authors and redactors of
the Talmud included a story that aims to secure the preeminence of
rabbinic courts over dissidents, and even over God, should scarcely be
surprising. Earlier I noted that a Talmudic passage asserts that
sages-rabbinical scholars-are superior to prophets and even to the
Torah itself.6" Of course, the assertion was written by (who else?)
rabbinical scholars. In Marbury v. Madison, the power of judicial review was established by (who else?) judges. Once we begin reflecting
on the politics contained within the Oven of Akhnai story, it is only a
small step to reflecting on the politics of those who wrote the story
and placed it in an authoritative text. The Grand Inquisitor is nothing
if not subtle, and he is sometimes indistinguishable from a rabbi or a
judge.
Earlier I noted a disturbing feature of Joshua's and Jeremiah's
dismissal of the bat kol, namely that their authority rests entirely on
62. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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their claim to be faithful expositors of the truth that they now insist
they don't want to hear. To understand just how outrageous their
argument is, notice once again that they immediately confiscate objects that they know are ritually pure-because the bat kol has told
them so-and burn them as if they are impure. And henceforth they
will require the community that follows their edicts to perform ritual
acts that they (and perhaps they alone) know are ritually incorrect.
And yet they will claim to govern the community on the ground that
they are masters of ritual, and they will excommunicate anyone who
disagrees with them. They are like the Grand Inquisitor, who burns
Christ to prevent His words from interfering with the Church's political supremacy, which has no basis other than the word of Christ. To
call this hypocrisy seems like a grotesque understatement. It is a
power-play grounded in a tissue of lies-power pursued, one might
say, for its own sake.
The Grand Inquisitor, at least, has a theological explanation for
the cynicism and violence of his rule. He tells Christ that mankind is
too weak and flawed for the freedom that Christ's teaching promises;
and he freely confesses that centuries ago the Church secretly went
over to the side of the Tempter in the Wilderness, who knows better
than Christ that what humanity truly needs for its happiness is not
absolute freedom but absolute submission. Dostoevsky's analysis of
the Temptation in the Wilderness story, with its tortured reflection on
the agony of human freedom, is a masterpiece of existentialist blasphemy. The Talmud, unsurprisingly, contains nothing like this, no
indication that the rabbis are secretly at war with the God they pretend to serve in order to lord it over other men and women. (If they
were, it is hard to imagine God smiling at them.) But what is their
claim to authority, once they have rejected the heavenly voice?
C.

The Need for Artificial Unanimity

The Oven of Akhnai story continues:
Furthermore, Rabban Gamaliel [head of the academy] was in a
ship; a great wave threatened to sink him. He said: "I suppose this
is on account of Rabbi Eli'ezer." He stood up and said: "Master of
the world, it is manifest and known to you that I have not done this
for my honor nor for the honor of my father's house, but for Your
should not abound in Israel." Then the
honor, so that controversies
63
sea ceased to rage.

63. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 (translating Bava Metzia *59b).
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Rashi explains that Rabbi Gamaliel, as president (Nasi) of the
court, had authorized Eliezer's excommunication. He adds that the
reason was "to deter others from continually disputing the majority
opinion."64 As we saw earlier, Rashi defends an extreme form of rabbinic authority: even if the rabbis say right is left and left is right you
must obey them. Apparently, his concern was simply that without
finality in the majority opinion, the entire system of disputeresolution embodied in the rabbinic courts would unravel. In essence,
Rashi fears that without a principle of res judicata that upholds even
wrong opinions, disputes within the community will never be settled.
A wrong opinion that settles the dispute is better than no opinion,
and a dissenter like Eliezer who refuses to give up his dissent threatens to unsettle decisions that the community urgently needs to remain
settled. Provided that most of the court's opinions are well-reasoned
and valid, the erroneous ones should be upheld just as stringently as
the correct ones, for the entire system depends on compliance, and
there is no reliable way to settle which decisions are the right ones
except through the system itself. The overall utility of the system
compensates for its occasional errors, and if the system acknowledged
its errors its overall utility would drop. In baseball, if you argue the
umpire's calls, he will eject you from the game even when he knows
you are right.
What saves this view from pure powermongering is the judge's
public-regarding motive: Gamaliel excommunicated Eliezer neither
for his own benefit nor for that of his family, but solely to meet a
community need. Philip Soper has argued for an obligation to obey
the law provided that the lawgiver is legislating in the good faith belief that his rules are in the best interest even of those they disadvantage. 65 According to Soper, the obligation arises from the fact that
some decision, even if it is wrong, is better for the community than no
decision at all. He analogizes the enterprise of government to a lifeboat, where someone must take charge. Provided that the lifeboat
commander acts in good faith, even someone he enslaves and forces
to row has an obligation to obey.66
This argument has some force, but it is far from decisive. Soper
must show that the state is a lifeboat, that the only alternatives are
64. Artscroll Talmud, supra note 2,at 59b2 n.14-15 (translating Rashi's commentary on
Bava Metzia *59b).
65.

PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 79 (1984).

66. Id. at 88.121.
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unconditional obedience and pure anarchy, and that a false good-faith
belief is better than nothing. I have my doubts that it is possible to
show any of these things. 6 7 In the same way, Rashi must show that the
community cannot tolerate dissent and that if the rabbinic court lets
Eliezer get away with dissent the community will be ruined. The
power interpretation turns on precisely these issues. It seems pretty
clear where the Oven of Akhnai story comes out on these issues: the
moment that Rabbi Gamaliel reminds God that he excommunicated
Eliezer in good faith, the wave that threatened to engulf Gamaliel
subsides.
V. THE INJURY INTERPRETATION

A.

The Tort of Wronging With Words

But the power interpretation is not the end of the story, and
Rabbi Gamaliel's argument does not save him forever. Let us conclude the tale of the Oven of Akhnai:
Ima Shalom, the wife of R'Eliezer, was the sister of Rabban
Gamliel. From that incident [in which Rabban Gamliel excommunicated R'Eliezer] onwards, she did not68let R'Eliezer fall on his
face, i.e., recite the tachanun supplication.
The tachanun is the most somber prayer in the morning servicea recollection of the persecution and humiliation of the Jews, a confession that it results from our own sinfulness, and a prayer for God
to "turn back from Your flaring anger and relent from the evil meant
for Your people. ' 69 Its images are powerful: "I am wearied with my
sigh, every night I drench my bed, with my tears I soak my couch. My
eye is dimmed because of anger, aged by my tormentors.... Look
from heaven and perceive that we have become an object of scorn
and derision among the nations; we are regarded as the sheep led to
slaughter, to be killed, destroyed, beaten, and humiliated. '7° As the
Oven of Akhnai story indicates, the tachanun is recited with covered
face. The reason that Ima Shalom will not permit Eliezer to recite the
tachanun is that she fears the consequences if Eliezer reminds God of
his misery and humiliation by reciting this abject prayer.
67. I criticize Soper's argument in David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious
Lawbreakers, 52 U. PITr. L. REv. 793, 806-09 (1991).
68. ARTSCROLLTALMUD, supra note 2, at 59b'(translating Bava Metzia *59b).
69. THE COMPLETE ARTSCROLL SIDDUR 135 (Rabbi Nosson Scherman trans., 1990).
70. Id. at 133, 135.
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We learn this because the story relates that one day Ima Shalom
made a mistake and failed to stop Eliezer from reciting the tachanun.
She
found [R'Eliezer] falling on his face in the recitation of tachanun.
She said to him: Get up! You are killing my brother! Meanwhile, an
announcement went forth from the house of Rabban Gamliel stating that he had died. [R'Eliezer] said to his wife: How did you know
about Rabban Gamliel's death? She said to him: I have received
such a tradition from the house of my grandfather, King David: All
the gates of Heaven are locked, except for the gates of wrongdo71
ing.
Oddly enough, this enigmatic ending to the story contains the
core of its legal significance (and points us to our fourth way of reading the Oven of Akhnai).
I have mentioned that the Talmud's literary form is simply an extended commentary on the Mishnah, the earliest codification of the
law. The Oven of Akhnai story appears in a section dealing with tort
law, and, more specifically, in a subsection on injuries done to others
with words: the entire discussion concerns the Mishnaic injunction,
"Just as there is wronging in buying and selling, so there is wronging
with words. 7 2 Ima Shalom's final cryptic statement about her grandfather King David is a reference back to the discussion of the tort of
wronging with words immediately preceding the Oven of Akhnai
story. There the rabbis cite a psalm of David to support their assertions "that God metes out strict retribution to someone who wrongs
his fellow," and that punishment follows soon after the tearful prayers
of the victim. 73 The Oven of Akhnai story is then offered as an illustration of this point of tort law. Gamaliel has wronged Eliezer. The
moment that Eliezer recites the tearful tachanun prayer, which laments his humiliation and calls on God to help him, Gamaliel's
punishment becomes inescapable.
In the pages preceding the Oven of Akhnai, the Talmud analyzes
the prohibition on wronging with words as a prohibition on humiliating others, and the rabbis condemn the humiliation of others in the
strongest possible terms: "If anyone makes his friend's face turn white
from shame in public it is as if he has spilled blood. '74 "It is better that
71.
72.
context
73.
74.

ARTSCROLL TALMUD, supra note 2, at 59b2 -59b3(translating Bava Metzia *59b).
Id. at 58b' (translating Bava Metzia *58b). Stone notes this point about the story's
in Stone, supra note 1, at 857.
Id. at 59a' (translating Bava Metzia *59a).
Id. at 58b3 (translating Bava Metzia *58b).
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a person should cast himself into a fiery furnace than that he should
shame his fellow in public. '' 75 (In light of these passages, the innumerable daily humiliations that Israel inflicts on the Palestinians may be
seen as a direct affront to core precepts of traditional Jewish ethics;
and it is perhaps with this tradition in mind that the distinguished
Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit has defined a decent society as
one the institutions of which do not humiliate people-a definition, 7as
6
he makes clear, that he arrived at by reflecting on the Occupation. )
The rabbis next discuss a number of special cases of humiliation, and
conclude the section with the Oven of Akhnai story. Viewed through
the lens of its Talmudic context, the focal point of the Oven of
Akhnai fable is not the nature of legal authority, but rather the humiliation of Eliezer.
B.

The Problem of Dirty Hands

But of course the Oven of Akhnai story is not simply a peculiar
footnote to a discussion of the tort of humiliation. It is that, but it is
also all the other things we have seen. One peculiar contradiction in
the story is that God spares Rabbi Gamaliel from drowning when
Gamaliel offers his utilitarian argument for excommunicating Eliezer,
but in the end strikes Gamaliel down in punishment when Eliezer
recites the tachanun. The former passage suggests that God accepts
the utilitarian argument for ruthless rabbinic power, while the latter
suggests that God does not. How can we explain this anomaly? Apparently, the story contemplates an interesting possibility: that an
exercise of power like Gamaliel's can simultaneously be justified on
grounds of political morality, and condemned for the wrong it does to
an innocent.
In 1973, Michael Walzer published a famous essay, PoliticalAction: The Problem of Dirty Hands,77 which explores the dilemma of
politicians who must inevitably get their hands dirty in order to govern. "[A] particular act of government... may be exactly the right
thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it
guilty of a moral wrong. '78 Evidently, that precisely describes the
situation of Rabbi Gamaliel in the Oven of Akhnai. Walzer offers no
75.
76.
77.
160-80
78.

Id. at 59a' (translating Bava Metzia *59a).
AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY xi-1 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996).

Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
(1973).
Id. at 161.
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resolution to the paradox inherent in the problem of dirty hands (the
paradox is that the same act can be at once the right thing to do and
morally wrong), but he considers several approaches to it that in his
view seem partly right.79 One, the Machiavellian approach, simply
acknowledges that the successful prince's actions are sometimes morally wrong. Without denying wrongdoing or making excuses for it,
Machiavelli nonetheless commends the actions on the ground that
they will win eternal glory for the prince who succeeds at government."o The problem, Walzer observes, is that Machiavelli's solution
simply leaves the paradox unresolved. A second strategy, found in
Max Weber, insists that the political actor must pay a price for his
wrongdoing, by suffering qualms of conscience for it: he is to be a
suffering servant." Walzer thinks this is closer to the right track than
Machiavelli's commendation of glory, but he observes that few of us
will be satisfied knowing that the ruthless politician's conscience is
troubled. Only the politician decides how troubled his conscience will
be, and whether he is easy or harsh on himself, the performance
seems a trifle pointless. "We suspect the suffering servant of either
masochism or hypocrisy or both ...."82
The third position Walzer illustrates with Camus's The Just Assassins, a play in which anarchist murderers rejoice in their own hanging, because they find their crime incomplete until they have been
hanged for it. While Walzer is bemused by Camus's melodramatic
moral extremism, he agrees that when a politician "lies, manipulates,
and kills... we must make sure he pays the price. ' ' 83 He adds: "We
won't be able to do that, however, without getting our own hands
dirty, and then we must find some way of paying the price ourselves. '' 14 I am far from sure that Walzer's solution makes sense. The
problem is not just that the final sentence I quoted toys with the
prospect of an endless cycle of bloodshed and retribution. The problem is also that making sure the politician undergoes punishment for
his wrongdoing may deter him from doing it, and that fails to take
seriously the other half of the paradox, that getting his hands dirty is
the right thing to do, indeed the thing we count on him for.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

175-80.
175-76.
176-78. Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor may fall into this category.
177.
180.
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Satisfactory or not, it seems clear that the Oven of Akhnai story
represents the third strand of Walzer's argument, with an intriguing
twist. Gamaliel suffers no punishment for the wrong he does Eliezer
until Eliezer himself calls on God through the recitation of the tachanun. God, apparently, is willing to leave Gamaliel's dirty hands well
enough alone as long as Eliezer does not complain. When he complains, God acts.
There is no doubt something to be said for this as a law enforcement strategy-it is a way of ensuring that the rigors of punishment
are reserved for vindicating the victims who feel the wrong most
keenly, permitting social healing for those who do not. It is also a way
of conserving scarce enforcement resources, although of course scarce
resources are not a problem for omnipotence. At the same time, we
well understand that sometimes the most downtrodden victims are
the ones that do not complain, precisely because they are downtrodden-and we should not be oblivious to the perverse lesson that ruthless powerholders might draw from Gamaliel's punishment, namely
that they will be better off killing dissidents before they complain
rather than merely excommunicating them.
Perhaps there is a simpler lesson that the ending of the Oven of
Akhnai intends to teach. Even though it offers a vindication of rabbinic authority on political grounds-the need for artificial unanimity-in the final paragraphs the story seems to assert the primacy of
the personal. It says that there are good reasons for court authoritarianism-reasons good enough that God merely smiles at being tricked,
and spares the ruthless judicial politician Gamaliel when He is reassured that Gamaliel's ruthlessness was not merely a personal powergrab. But regardless of how good the reasons are, humiliating the
innocent to maintain authority is always and fundamentally a rupture
of human relations. It is, in the last analysis, always wrong, and no
utilitarian justification can make the wrong go away.
VI. ANTI-CONCLUSION

There is no such thing as an innocent act of reading-no "reading degree zero" in which the reader simply plumbs a text without
importing an agenda of questions and an array of conceivable answers. I would have liked to conclude this Article by writing that the
Oven of Akhnai story sounds universally-interesting themes about
authority and law-as we have seen, at least four such themes. But I
cannot write that conclusion.
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The fact is that the issues explored here may not be universal,
and, more importantly, the underlying assumption that universality
matters is not universal. To those who insist upon their own cultural
particularity, a question is dangerous and threatening precisely to the
extent that it claims to be of universal interest. The questions I bring
to the Oven of Akhnai come from a source entirely external to the
Talmud, as a glance at my footnotes reveals: they come from a tradition of modern philosophy and English-language legal theory featuring names like Arendt, Cohen, Dworkin, Farber, Hampshire, Holmes,
Hume, Kierkegaard, Margalit, Shapiro, Soper, Stone, Waldron, and
Walzer. All these writers are, in an important sense, children of the
Enlightenment. A perceptive reader will also notice that most of
them are Jews, and that my own Jewishness (perhaps theirs as well) is
hardly incidental to the essay. It is nevertheless a Jewishness that has
passed into an entirely different world than that of the Talmudic
academies. All Jews today are children of the Enlightenment-the
haskalah, the reform movement with roots in the secular Enlightenment. That is true even of the ultra-Orthodox, who represent a selfconscious return to tradition rather than its unmediated continuation.
And so I cannot say that the Oven of Akhnai story implicates
universally interesting issues about authority and law. Furthermore, I
am brought up short by the thought that in an important sense I cannot understand the Oven of Akhnai story at all.
I cannot understand the Oven of Akhnai story at all. It is not
written for me. It is written for readers within a tradition that I merely
peer at from outside. I never studied Gemara or experienced the intellectual rigors of the cheder. I do not govern my life by the commandments, and, except as an exercise in sympathetic projection, I
cannot take seriously the legal question that Eliezer and the other
rabbis debated-whether an oven made of sections cemented together with sand might be tahor (pure) even though it has come into
the vicinity of tumah (religious pollutions inherent in certain people
or objects),5 I barely know who Rabbis Eliezer, Gamaliel, Joshua,
85. For the record, the conflict derives from several texts in the Mishnah. The Mishnah
section entitled Kelim enumerates twenty sources of uncleanness (turnah), and states, "Lo, these
render man and vessels unclean by contact, and earthenware vessels by [presence within the
vessels' contained] airspace." MISHNAH NEW TRANSLATION, supra note 9, at 893 (translating
Kelim 1:1). Another text declares that an oven becomes susceptible to tumah from the moment
its manufacture is complete, and goes on to specify that its manufacture is complete when it has
been baked at a temperature hot enough to bake a sponge cake. Id. at 900 (translating Kelim
5:1). Thus, the question becomes whether the oven cut into sections and reassembled with
unbaked mortar satisfies this condition. The Mishnah raises this question in a cryptic passage
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and Jeremiah were supposed to be (other than second-century sages),
and I am wholly incapable of the method of argument within the tradition-pulling together prooftexts scattered throughout the Gemara
and the Tanakh (the Hebrew bible).
The tradition itself locates the authority of scholars in a chain extending back to Moses. 86 As I indicated earlier, one part of that tradition ascribes superiority to the Oral Law over the Torah itself-"The
teachings of the Scribes [rabbis] are more cherished than those of the
Torah.18 7 From that standpoint, no one who is not steeped in the Oral
Law can really understand the basic texts of Judaism, any more than
someone who has studied every line of the U.S. Constitution but
knows nothing of Supreme Court cases can really understand constitutional law. Unable to trace the lineage of my reading back in an
unbroken chain to Moses, I am not really a reader in the only sense
the tradition takes seriously.
Of course, within religious traditions themselves we invariably
find strands that insist on the possibility of unmediated readings of
sacred texts-innocent readings, readings degree zero. Protestants
broke with Roman Catholicism by insisting that Scripture belongs to
everyone, and Luther's translation of the Bible into German was a
deeply subversive act. Within Judaism, a sect known as the Karaites,
dating back to eighth-century Babylonia, decried rabbinic interpretation and the Oral Law and insisted on reading the Torah directly.88 As
Sanford Levinson and Thomas Grey have pointed out, this dispute
has counterparts in American constitutionalism. 9
The history of the Counterreformation makes obvious that such
teachings invite violent responses. Early Protestants, like Jews, faced
the Grand Inquisitor and the auto da f6. But Karaites received no less
hostile reception from the rabbis. A group of Spanish and Portuguese
Jews, practicing their religion secretly during the time of the Inquisi-

that originates our story: "[If] he cut it up [breadthwise] into pieces and put dirt between each
ring- R. Eliezer declares Iitj clean. And sages declare [it] unclean. This is the oven of Akhnai."
Id. at 902 (translating Kelim 5:10). These three lines are the entire source of our story.
86. "Moses received Torah from Sinai and passed it on to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders,
and the elders to the prophets, and the prophets passed it on to the Men of the Great Assembly." AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 254 (translating Mishnah Avot 1:1).
87. Id. at 261 (translating Midrash Rabbah: Song of Songs 1:2).
88. See id. at 281-89, 536. The Karaites were also textual literalists, but for present purposes that is not as relevant as the fact that they insisted on an unmediated encounter between
reader and text. Such an encounter need not imply textual literalism.
89. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18-53 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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tion, finally gave up their double life and emigrated to Amsterdam.
During their closeted years, they had lost their knowledge of rabbinic
Judaism and practiced their faith simply by reading the Torah; they
became, in effect, involuntary Karaites. The Amsterdam synagogue,
thriving in the tolerant atmosphere of Holland, proved that it was not
so tolerant itself: it excommunicated them, just as Joshua and Gamaliel excommunicated the de facto Karaite Eliezer. 90 Karaism is the
ultimate heresy, a threat to rabbinical authority.
The thoughts in the last paragraph obviously reflect the power
interpretation, and no doubt the power interpretation reassures
Karaites that those who condemn them are merely playing politics.
But matters are not that simple, for in an important way Karaites
misunderstand what it means to read a legal text. Wittgenstein wrote:
"To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life." 91 By definitionone might say by self-definition-Karaites cannot participate in the
conversation, the form of life, that makes up the Talmud. And in this
respect, an outsider reader of the Oven of Akhnai is like a Karaite,
someone who thinks it is possible to read a section of the Talmud
simply by reading its words. That assumption inevitably begs the
question, because the words alone are like a bat kol, and the Oven of
Akhnai tells us to disregard the bat kol and follow the majority.
Those within the tradition understand that the story's real meaning is
for members only. It does not disclose itself to modernist readers who
privilege their own one-on-one relationship to the printed text over
the many-on-many relationship between text and readers that makes
up the form of life the text itself celebrates.
There is a kind of vertigo that comes from reading a story that
insists on its own unreadability. Of all writers, Borges is perhaps the
one who most often takes metaphysical vertigo of this sort as his
theme. Borges's heroes are mystics, antiquarians, theologians, and
scholars of arcane doctrines whose research leads them into textual
labyrinths (and who sometimes find real minotaurs inside them). In
"Averrois' Search," Borges tells the story of a defeat inflicted on
Averrois, the great medieval Islamic commentator on Aristotle. Aristotle's Poetics deals with the nature of tragic and comic drama, but
Averroes labored under the disadvantage that theater was unknown
90.
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in the Islamic world. In Borges's ironic story, Averroes dines with a
famous traveler who unsuccessfully attempts to describe a stage-play
he witnessed in China. No one understands what he is talking about,
and one dinner guest explains why such a thing is impossible. After
the dinner, the philosopher returns to his study and at last thinks he
grasps what Aristotle's peculiar words "tragedy" and "comedy"
mean.
With firm, painstaking calligraphy, he added these lines to the
manuscript: Aristu [Aristotle] gives the name "tragedy" to panegyrics and the name "comedy" to satires and anathemas. There are
many admirable tragedies9 and comedies in the Qur'an and the
mu'allaqat of the mosque.2
Of course, Averroes was completely mistaken. In the epilogue to
his story, Borges offers the following reflection on the peculiar case of
"a man who sets himself a goal that is not forbidden to other men, but
is forbidden to him":
I recalled Averroeis, who, bounded within the circle of Islam, could
never know the meaning of the words tragedy and comedy. I told
his story; as I went on ... I felt that the work mocked me, foiled
me, thwarted me. I felt that Averrois, trying to imagine what a play
is without ever having suspected what a theater is, was no more absurd than I, trying to imagine Averrois.... I felt, on the last page,
that my story was a symbol of the man I had been as I was writing
it, and that in order to write that story I had had to be that man,
and that in order to be that man I had had to write that story, and
just when I stop believing in him,
so on, ad infinitum. (And
93
"Averroes" disappears.)
And therefore (but Borges cannot really say it), "Borges" disappears
as well.
The modernist reader approaching the Oven of Akhnai is like
Borges approaching Averroes approaching Aristotle. To grasp the
story is to realize that it concerns the impossibility of grasping it
merely through reading. This may be true of all written law. The
Oven of Akhnai is a labyrinth of meanings that would no doubt
please Borges immensely. To recognize it as a labyrinth is already to
know that you are lost in one of its innumerable dead ends.
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